Este artículo analiza la presencia simbólica del amor, la belleza y el ‘eterno femenino’ en la tragedia Fausto de Johann Wolfgang von Goethe a través de la hermenéutica comparativa con dos textos fundamentales del Renacimiento, De los heroicos furores de Giordano Bruno y la Hypnerotomachia Poliphili de Colonna. La tesis de partida es que los tres amores de Fausto, Margarita, Helena y la Mater Gloriosa, son en realidad una representación simbólica de los tres aspectos fundamentales del alma que (...) también podemos encontrar en estos dos textos por su conexión con la tradición neoplatónica. (shrink)

The notion of transgenerational community is usually based on two diachronic interactions. The first interaction consists of present generations taking up the legacy (not only economic, but also institutional, artistic, cultural, and so forth) of past generations and giving it continuity, exercising a form of active agency. The second interaction occurs when present generations pass on their legacy to future generations. This is supposed to expand the boundaries of the community in a transgenerational sense (both backward- and forward-looking). In this (...) article we argue that the transgenerational community can be grounded on a different ontological insight: future generations play the role of fictional actors for present generations, i.e., present generations entertain a present-time interaction with future generations, insofar as future generations are functional for the realization of transgenerational actions. This lays the foundations for more solid community-based bonds of intergenerational justice. (shrink)

We show that given a finite, transitive and reflexive Kripke model 〈 W , ≼, ⟦ ⋅ ⟧ 〉 and $${w \in W}$$ , the property of being simulated by w (i.e., lying on the image of a literalpreserving relation satisfying the ‘forth’ condition of bisimulation) is modally undefinable within the class of S4 Kripke models. Note the contrast to the fact that lying in the image of w under a bi simulation is definable in the standard modal language even (...) over the class of K4 models, a fairly standard result for which we also provide a proof. We then propose a minor extension of the language adding a sequent operator $${\natural}$$ (‘tangle’) which can be interpreted over Kripke models as well as over topological spaces. Over finite Kripke models it indicates the existence of clusters satisfying a specified set of formulas, very similar to an operator introduced by Dawar and Otto. In the extended language $${{\sf L}^+ = {\sf L}^{\square\natural}}$$ , being simulated by a point on a finite transitive Kripke model becomes definable, both over the class of (arbitrary) Kripke models and over the class of topological S4 models. As a consequence of this we obtain the result that any class of finite, transitive models over finitely many propositional variables which is closed under simulability is also definable in L + , as well as Boolean combinations of these classes. From this it follows that the μ -calculus interpreted over any such class of models is decidable. (shrink)

Memories are mental states with a number of interesting features. One of those features seems to be their having an intentional object. After all, we commonly say that memories are about things, and that a subject represents the world in a certain way by virtue of remembering something. It is unclear, however, what sorts of entities constitute the intentional objects of memory. In particular, it is not clear whether those are mind-independent entities in the world or whether they are mental (...) entities of some kind. The purpose of this chapter is to map the different positions on this issue, and to highlight the virtues and difficulties for each of the options. In Section 2, I will specify the question of what the intentional objects of memory are by clarifying the relevant notions of memory and intentional object. In Section 3, I will motivate the significance of identifying the intentional objects of memory by exploring the relations between, on the one hand, the intentionality of memory and, on the other hand, the phenomenology and the epistemology of memory. In Section 4, I will consider two natural candidates for being the intentional objects of memory, namely, worldly entities and mental entities, and I will raise some concerns for each of the two candidates. A promising alternative will emerge, in Section 5, as preserving the virtues of the two original candidates while avoiding their difficulties. The alternative will concern a certain combination of worldly and mental entities; a combination that involves both causal and truth-making relations. I will conclude by sketching how the alternative candidate can shed some light on the phenomenological and epistemological issues raised in the third section. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to introduce an approach for understanding social cognition that we call the normative approach to social cognition. Such an approach, which results from a systematization of previous arguments and ideas from authors such as Ryle, Dewey, or Wittgenstein, is an alternative to the classic model and the direct social perception model. In section 2, we evaluate the virtues and flaws of these two models. In section 3, we introduce the normative approach, according to (...) which human, socio-cognitive competences rely on a myriad of social norms and routines that mediate our social interactions in such a way that we can make sense of each other without taking into consideration their mental states. In sections 4 and 5, we find some common premises shared by the two prior models and offer some arguments against them. In section 6, we advance some possible arguments against our approach and offer some responses against them. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se pretende mostrar la importante función que Suárez tiene reservada a los entes de razón: el aseguramiento de la validez científica. Al respecto resulta fundamental caer en la cuenta de la diferencia entre la quimera y el resto de los entes de razón: negación, relación de razón y privación. Con ello Suárez ha asentado las bases de la manera propiamente barroca de entender el mundo: una realidad extramental para cuyo conocimiento científico requerimos de la introducción del (...) artificio, del ente de razón; aunque Suárez tiene aún en mente el modelo de ciencia aristotélica, basado en la relación de universalidad, lo que le hace despreciar los entes de razón matemáticos. En todo caso, creemos que los entes de razón ayudan a comprender la singularidad de la metafísica barroca respecto al ontologismo posterior. Nos situamos así, críticamente, frente a las interpretaciones marcadamente ontologistas de la metafísica de Suárez. (shrink)

Objetivo: analizar las tendencias de la formación bioética e intercultural en los programas de enfermería, y establecer los aspectos que deben contemplarse para mejorar la formación. Materiales y método: búsqueda de información en bases de datos científicas de acceso libre y repositorios de tesis doctorales de universidades; se utilizaron las palabras clave: “Bioética”, “Educación”, “Formación”, “Enfermería”, “Cultura”, en español e inglés. No se establecen límites según la fecha de publicación. Resultados: la mayoría de investigaciones se enfocan en el currículo académico, (...) hay poca información sobre interculturalidad, pero se retoma el tema de transculturalidad. Conclusión: es necesario hacer de la ética y la bioética un tema trasversal en los currículos académicos, además de incluir la interculturalidad en los planes de estudio. (shrink)

I offer an account of thought insertion based on a certain model of self-knowledge. I propose that subjects with thought insertion do not experience being committed to some of their own beliefs. A hypothesis about self-knowledge explains why. According to it, we form beliefs about our own beliefs on the basis of our evidence for them. First, I will argue that this hypothesis explains the fact that we feel committed to those beliefs which we are aware of. Then, I will (...) point to one feature of schizophrenia that suggests that subjects with thought insertion may not be able to know their own beliefs in that way. (shrink)

Reflecting the current turn in curriculum work that underscores the relationship between theory and practice, this volume brings together the voices of curriculum theorists working within academic setting and practitioners working in schools and other educational settings. The book traces their collaborative work, challenging the assumption that practitioners should be only consumers of the theory produced by academics. Thus, this collection engages readers in the complicated conversation about the relationship between theory and practice, between theoreticians and practitioners. Although every author (...) is, to some degree, a practitioner as well as a theorist, their collaboration emerges from the particular positions and identification that each assumes in the practice of their craft. From working with homeless youth to deepening one's personal commitment to antiracist pedagogy in schools, each author's experience implodes the false binary of the theory/practice dichotomy, illuminating a different dimension of the challenges therein. (shrink)

El presente artículo intenta dar cuenta de la función constructiva del doblez, la contradicción y la inversión en Alcestis de Eurípides. Para ello, define los principales términos en discusión, explora la obra en busca de sus manifestaciones y señala por qué los múltiples elementos contradictorios de esta tragedia, lejos de ser distracciones o descuidos, ponen en primer plano -y de un modo que habría sido impensable en un discurso monológico- la complejidad del universo narrativo e ideológico de Eurípides. This article (...) sets out to tackle the constructive function of the fold, the contradiction and the inversion in Euripides' Alcestis. To this end, it defines the main terms under consideration, explores the tragedy in search of their manifestations, and indicates why the manifold contradictory elements present in the play, far from being distractions, underline the complexity of Euripides' ideological and narrative universe. (shrink)

The Modern concept of truth, which subjects truth to certainty, broke the harmonious relation between reality and truth, that prevailed in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. Hans-Georg Gadamer thinks that the main task of contemporary Philosophy is to recover the original harmony of being and knowledge. To shed light on the nature of this problem, we expound the metaphysical-theological foundation of truth, which is at the roots of Aristotelian and Thomistic Philosophies. Specifically, we analyze here the relation between being, truth and (...) logos in the Aristotelian treatise Perì Hermeneías, and in its Thomistic commentary. (shrink)

Hacemos en el presente trabajo un pequeño recorrido a propósito de las manifestaciones o expresiones de ateísmo y materialismo, popular y culto, a fines del siglo XVIII y dos primeras décadas del siglo XIX, a partir, sobre todo, de los archivos inquisitoriales del Tribunal de Santiago de Compostela o Galicia. empleando una metodología mixta (historia conceptual, antropología cultural, historia de las ideologías, historia de la filosofía, etc.) y en base a fuentes documentales del siglo XIX tomadas del Archivo Histórico de (...) la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela (poco conocidas) o del Archivo Histórico Nacional de Madrid (inéditas), arqueológicamente, intentamos reconstruir 25 agitados años de la historia de la cultura gallega, centrándonos muy especialmente en la historia del pensamiento filosófico. (shrink)

En este artículo se reconstruye la propuesta ética de la “fenomenología clásica” desarrollada por E. Husserl y M. Scheler. En ella la noción de valor queda inscrita dentro del ámbito de la “razón”, pero de una razón ampliada, que es una auténtica “razón afectiva”, en la que se enlazan sentimientos (subjetivos) y valores (objetivos). Para ello se adopta la perspectiva husserliana de una fenomenología subjetivo-trascendental, que se aleja del objetivismo, evitando así una posible lectura objetivista de la teoría de Scheler.

The authors undertake a thought experiment the purpose of which is to explore possibilities for understanding moral principles in analogy with cosmic order. The experiment is based on three proposals, which are described in detail: an ontological, a neurological, and a moral proposal. The ontological proposal accepts from the phenomena of quantum physics that there is a nonempirical domain of physical reality that consists not of material things but of what is philosophically conceptualized as a realm of nonmaterial forms. This (...) realm of forms is the realm of potentiality in physical reality that quantum physics posits as an indivisible Wholeness—the One. It is the ultimate reality because everything empirical is the actualization of its forms. The neurological proposal is the hypothesis that the brain is sensitive to the potentiality waves in the cosmic field, as ordinary measuring instruments in physics are sensitive to potentiality waves at the quantum level, so that the cosmic field can communicate with the human brain. The third proposal assumes that the communication with the cosmic field can translate into moral ideas and actions. Even though the three proposals underlying the thought experiment are highly speculative, they lead to definite implications that make sense in their own right and can be applied in a useful way. From the order of reality some simple rules of conduct follow that are identical with traditional moral rules but have the character of rules of well-ness, leading to new aspects of Aristotle's concept of eudaimonia and Kant's concept of the highest good. In analogy with the structure of physical reality, where all empirical phenomena are actualizations of nonempirical forms, it is suggested that the structure of morality, too, is that of a tacit, nonempirical form that actualizes in explicit principles and moral acts through our consciousness. The tacit form is thought to exist in the realm of cosmic potentiality, together with all the other forms that the empirical world actualizes. It can appear spontaneously in our consciousness when needed, offering its guidance to our judgment and free will. Because it does not appear in the form of commandments accompanied by threats, the actions of the tacit moral form define a higher level of morality, similar to that offered by some aspects of the Christian teaching, where one acts not out of fear but on the desire to do things right. (shrink)

In this article I defend two theses related to the ontology of the mind and the conception of explanatory levels supposed by evolutionary psychology. First, that the theory of mind adopted by this program can not remove all dualist remnant and present an acceptable picture of mind-body relationship. Second, that the difficulties presented by the ontological hypothesis, in addition to certain plausible theses on the explanatory compatibility, reduce in wide measure the attractiveness of pluralism of levels defended.

Philosophy and Neuroscience is an unabashed apologetic for reductionism in philosophy of mind. Bickle chides his fellow philosophers for their ignorance of mainstream neuroscience, and promises them that a subscription to Cell, Neuron, or any other journal in mainstream neuroscience will be amply rewarded. Rather than being bogged down in the intricacies of two-dimensional semantics or the ontology of properties, philosophers of mind need to get neuroscientifically informed and ruthlessly reductive.

Somogy Varga's criticisms and questions provide me with a welcome opportunity to clarify some key elements of my proposal. First, I briefly summarize my motivation and original proposal for a phenomenological–dimensional research program. Second, I address Varga's two challenges. Each challenge highlights an element of my proposal that was underdeveloped in the original article. I therefore provide a brief clarification of my proposal before responding directly to Varga's two challenges.My proposal is to shift phenomenological psychopathology toward a broadly dimensional, rather (...) than categorial, research program. This approach will allow phenomenologists to operate outside the constraints of... (shrink)

En la sociedad moderna se tiende a pensar que lo que no se cuenta no existe. Esta afirmación es real en un alto porcentaje, lo que confiere una gran responsabilidad a los medios de comunicación a la hora de elaborar y difundir su trabajo. Sin duda, la libertad de expresión y la libertad de prensa son pilares esenciales de un sistema democrático en sentido estricto. Son imprescindibles para que los ciudadanos puedan estar bien informados, sean capaces de formarse su propia (...) opinión y actuar en consecuencia. Sin embargo, hay otras libertades fundamentales de los ciudadanos que no pueden verse ignoradas, que no pueden dejar de respetarse por el recurso fácil a la libertad de expresión o de prensa. Es decir, los periodistas y los medios de comunicación deben cumplir, como cualquier otro profesional, los compromisos inherentes a su ética y deontología a la hora de informar, analizar, comentar u opinar sobre la actualidad diaria que afecta o interesa a los ciudadanos. En el caso de la lucha contra el terrorismo, el compromiso y la responsabilidad deben aumentar por la delicadeza y trascendencia de lo que se cuenta en los medios de comunicación y en las redes sociales y por la manipulación a extrema que los terroristas hacen de la propaganda, disfrazada de información, para conseguir sus macabros objetivos. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es mostrar que el marco conceptual que reduce la psiquiatría a una ciencia empírica, dejando al margen a la filosofía, es claramente insuficiente. Para ello se recupera la propuesta del psiquiatra Kurt Schneider y se muesran sus paralelos con fenomenólogos como Edmund Husserl o Max Scheler. El artículo se centra en la distinción entre motivo y causa, que es fundamental en la definición de neurosis y psicosis, y que es también el núcleo de la argumentación (...) de Husserl cuando aboga por la “actitud personalista”, frente a la “actitud naturalista”. (shrink)